(In)visible Ghosts in the Machine and the Powers that Bind: The Relational Securitization of Anonymous by Dunn Cavelty, Myriam & Jaeger, Mark Daniel
(In)visible Ghosts in the Machine and the
Powers that Bind: The Relational
Securitization of Anonymous1
Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Mark Daniel Jaeger
ETH Zurich
This paper analyzes the formation and subsequent securitization of the
digital protest movement Anonymous, highlighting the emergence of
social antagonists from communication itself. In contrast to existing
approaches that implicitly or explicitly conceptualize Othering (and
securitization) as unidirectional process between (active) sender and
(passive) receiver, an approach that is based on communication gives
the “threat” a voice of its own. The concept proposed in this paper
focuses on “designations” as communicating rules and attributes with
regard to a government object. It delineates how designations give rise
to the visibility of political entities and agency in the first place. Apply-
ing this framework, we can better understand the movement’s path
from a bunch of anonymous individuals to the collectivity “Anonymous,”
posing a threat to certain bases of the state’s ontological existence, its
prerogative to secrecy, and challenging its claim to unrestrained surveil-
lance. At the same time, the state’s bases are implicated and reproduced
in the way this conflict is constructed. The conflict not only (re)pro-
duces and makes visible “the state” as a social entity, but also changes or
at least challenges the self-same entity’s agency and legitimacy. Such a
relational approach allows insights into conflict formation as dynamic
social process.
Over the past few years, the name “Anonymous” has become associated with a
new form of global protest, one that uses digital interruption campaigns and
computer break-ins with subsequent release of sensitive information as modus
operandi (Coleman and Ralph 2011; Olsen 2013). Beyond its slogans (“We are
Anonymous. We are Legion. We do not forgive. We do not forget. Expect us.”),
its use of Guy Fawkes masks, and its (sometime) orientation toward issues of cen-
sorship, information freedom, and anonymous speech, the movement resists
straightforward definition and classification. Shrouded in deliberate mystery and
born of anonymity in a time obsessed with surveillance as ostensible enabler of
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political control, it purports to have no leaders, hierarchical structure, or geo-
graphical epicenter. However, despite, or rather because of, its elusiveness,
together with its targeting behavior and communication practices, the movement
has become a symbol for one of the twenty-first-century challenges to the security
of many states: cyber-threats.
While Anonymous is certainly not the sole reason for the sustained, worldwide
attention that network intrusions and disruptions are receiving, it nevertheless
plays an intriguing and hitherto little researched part in it. Several aspects of its
emergence as a collectivity (with ascribed political agency or status as a political
actor) and, ultimately, national security threat are noteworthy. Most importantly,
Anonymous does not just passively emerge as a threat by state designation, but is
actively taking part in its own securitization by forcefully undercutting the state’s
prerogative to secrecy and authoritative information. Moreover, it also suggests
and successfully establishes counter-securitizations, in which the state is pre-
sented as the main threat. Therefore, this political conflict is itself characterized,
fueled, and sustained by conflicting meaning-making, in which a process of reci-
procal securitization is serving a complex and curious identity function on both
sides of the social conflict. On the one hand, Anonymous moves toward a set of
well-established national security discourses, most notably the master discourse
of terrorism. By thus encountering very specific state responses, the emergence
of Anonymous as political actor first and foremost reinforces a view of the entity
commonly referred to as “the state” as rule enforcer or punisher. However, the
same emergence also changes, or at least challenges, stable notions of the state,
albeit more subtly by adding a moment of self-reflection and by making fault
lines appear within it.
Given these observations, we aim to trace and analyze the complex emergence
of this digital (non-)entity—which proclaims itself to be “a collective of people
with too much time on their hands, a commune of human thought and useless
imagery . . . a gathering of sheep and fools, assholes and trolls, normal everyday
netizens”2—particularly in its transformation into a political actor, to which some
people ascribe the ability to pose a grave threat to national security.3 We also
want to understand how “the state” is itself implicated, (re)produced, and possi-
bly changed in and through this securitization. In order to do so, we conceptual-
ize the securitization of this protest movement as a dynamic, complex, relational
struggle over threat-making and meaning-making, which shapes the antagonistic
actors involved.
Much critical International Relations (IR) literature has focused on how states
position themselves with regard to other states (or groups) and how this concep-
tualization of Self/Other (so-called “Othering”) has constitutive effects on the
notion (or identity) of the Self (cf. most prominently, Campbell 1992), often
with security implications. However, the process of Othering in IR is mostly ana-
lyzed as a unidirectional process, in which the Other does not play an active
role; Othering works as a mere projection. The same can be said for securitiza-
tion studies. Most approaches to securitization presuppose bounded
“communities” as political entities and then investigate securitization as discur-
sive practices of communication unfolding within them. Potential security issues
might be taken to lie inside such communities or outside of them but, in any
case, they are assumed to be passive projections which do not actively partake in
discursive practices. In other words, dangers do not communicate—agency remains
2Anonymous/Original. Available at https://encyclopediadramatica.se/Anonymous/Original. (Accessed August
8, 2014.)
3For example, Ex-NSA director General Keith Alexander reportedly said: “A stateless group like Anonymous
doesn’t yet have that capability . . . But if the group’s members around the world developed or acquired it, an attack
on the power grid would become far more likely” (Wall Street Journal 2012).
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(pre-)assigned to known communities or to particular actors within them. These
approaches thus largely overlook how relational processes of contestation are
generative of the visibility of antagonistic entities and observed agency in the
first place.
We break with this orthodoxy and purport that conflict constellations merit a
conceptualization of threats not as passive projections, but as active participants.
They partake in the production of antagonistic relationships, characterized by
relational meaning contestations that make opponents visible. In the first sec-
tion, we introduce a theoretical framework that permits studying the relational
securitization we observed. In order to not simply distinguish by actors but
rather by what takes place as a property of the communication or relation
between them, we use the concept of designations. It builds on an understanding
of communication as social process (Luhmann 1995) and on relational sociol-
ogy, both of which discourage the reduction of complex processes to steady
states (Emirbayer 1997).
Designations communicate rules and attributes constituting a “governance
object” (cf. Corry 2013). As socially binding propositions, designations establish
relations in a twofold way: first, between a governance object and a social entity
subscribing to them and, second, between this entity and other social entities
subscribing to different, competing designations concerning the governance
object. Competing designations, in turn, are constitutive of the conflict in
which these entities/collectivities emerge as opponents. In the second section,
we look at the emergence of Anonymous as a political actor and security
threat. We will show the unfolding process of “anonymous” individuals becom-
ing “Anonymous,” the collectivity, finally seen as posing a threat to certain
bases of the state’s ontological existence, while these bases are at the same
time reproduced in the particular way the conflict is constructed. In conclu-
sion, we reflect on the broader epistemological and political implications of
what we have observed.
Competing Designations and Securitization
Acts of “Othering” as a part of mutual (identity) constructions of the Self and
the Other are a central focus of different variants of (critical) security studies
(cf. Der Derian 1990; Campbell 1992; Doty 1996; Neumann 1999). However, the
model of communication these studies are based on comes with two limitations.
First, even though most studies employ a language of “interrelatedness” between
entities in such construction processes, they assume bounded (and fixed) politi-
cal collectivities who shape the world of politics around them by projecting rep-
resentations of difference onto other (passive) collectivities (who in turn do the
same). Second, there is a predominant emphasis on political agency, without
much reflection on its conditions of possibility. Conceptualizing dangers as pro-
jections centers the analysis on the (securitizing) agents—the speakers—and con-
comitants of such projections. In consequence, conflict escalation often appears
as an intentional communicative act, making it difficult to understand how situa-
tions might unintentionally deteriorate. Yet focusing on authorship, be it of state
officials or security bureaucracies, largely neglects how relational processes of
contestation generate the visibility of antagonistic entities and construct agency
in the first place.
These conceptions reject a sender–receiver model of communication to the
extent that there is no communication beyond bounded collectivities at all. Like
prisoners interpreting shadows in Plato’s cave, they only know self-referential
projection. The same goes for securitization studies, with their aim of under-
standing the processes that turn political issues into security issues (Buzan,
Wæver and de Wilde 1998; Balzacq 2005). We find a similar treatment of “that
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which threatens,” which is not given a voice of its own, and does not actively par-
take in discursive practices. The merits of these approaches lie in highlighting
that perceived threats are inherently socially constructed. However, the question
remains: Who is actually partaking in this construction? Frequently, constructed
dangers are not passive and they are not silent. To the contrary, they can play a
very active role in the securitization process and one, as we argue, that should be
further unpacked to understand conflict dynamics, especially their early forma-
tion and escalation/de-escalation.
We therefore propose an understanding of securitization that takes up what
was once central to social constructivism—the primacy of the relational—and
builds on the tradition of sociological thinking that emphasizes the emergent
quality of entities. Rather than taking social order in terms of rules or structures
as point of departure, it treats relations as “prior to either individual agents or
aggregate structures” (Nexon 2010:100). In other words, social relations, based
on communication, constitute things. Political entities such as groups, actors,
states, and governance objects emerge, along with their meaning and their even-
tual boundaries, as social facts in their being (re)produced in social relations
(Emirbayer 1997:287). This approach differs from existing conceptualizations of
Othering or speech acts to the extent that it conceives of action as part of com-
munication, not the other way around (Albert, Kessler and Stetter 2008:56). In
this section, we show how this works. First, we delve deeper into the relationship
between communication, relations, and the emergent quality of social entities.
Second, we describe how politics is fundamentally about generating (collectivity
binding) designations. Third, we say a few words about the specific context in
which we employ this framework of analysis.
Social Relations through Communication: The Basics
We purport that relations are established in communication, suggested by Niklas
Luhmann as a basic denominator of social reality. Communication generates
meaning and entities. Meaning is un-owned. “Authors” do not have outright power
over meaning; it does not travel unambiguously to an addressee, as between pre-
given sender and receiver. There is no unequivocal understanding—
rather there is double contingency between message and understanding of commu-
nicated information. Communication based on Luhmann’s concepts results from
the interplay of these three specific elements.
This notion differs in two important aspects from the limited communication
model used in many poststructuralist studies. First, a mutual orientation of com-
municating entities cannot be presumed. Authors and addressees only emerge
from completing a three-step sequence (Luhmann 1995:137–150): (i) any com-
munication seeks to impose a meaning as part of its particular message, and it
evokes a specific understanding; (ii) based on this understanding, it is either
accepted or rejected in the follow-up operation which again evokes understand-
ing; and (iii) this leads either to consensual meaning or to a conflict. Initially,
there is no requirement of an intention to communicate something—decisive is
the “backward” construction thereof as part of a specific understanding. There is
double contingency and double emergence, creating a relation in orienting the
involved as authors and addressees toward each other as entities.
Second, an “addressee” produces communication and meaning as much as an
“author” does. Neither “message” nor “understanding” is ontologically privileged—
there is no “true” message and “true” understanding. Communication, its
meaning, results from the unity of difference between information, message, and
understanding. Both authors and addressees contribute equally to the specific
meaning emerging out of a communication process (Albert et al. 2008).
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In consequence, there is no speaker–audience relation wherein a pre-destined
and passive audience accepts or rejects the unequivocal message of a pre-given
speaker. The speaker–audience distinction is artificial and analytically mislead-
ing. Communication is more than the sum of its parts. Therefore, social actions
cannot be reduced to individual agents since they are interpreted, re-ascribed,
distorted, and “socially overshaped” in highly contingent ways (Lohse 2011:199).
Speech acts do not exist on the merits of an intentional individual actor, but
because communication establishes relations, authorship, and agency as specific
meaning (cf. Jackson and Nexon 1999).
By implication, neither a preexisting political actor nor a supposed opponent
establishes antagonisms as they, along with the antagonism itself, emerge from
mutually contingent interpretation processes. With this relational component,
emerging opponents actively partake in securitization. Dangers, far from being
merely passive projections, are linked to an evolving antagonistic relation. Yet an
essential part of communication lies in establishing entities. It is only when enti-
ties attain “visibility” that they may acquire actor qualities in social relations
as authors and addressees.4 Below, we theorize how a new entity emerges as
antagonistic agent in contingent communication, partaking in its construction as
danger and itself constructing dangers.
The Politics of Designations
Based on the systems theoretical ideas of Armin Nassehi (2002), we argue that
entities emerge politically in communication through collectivity-binding designa-
tions concerning a governance object. Designations communicate propositions which
socially bind collectivities as they subscribe to the constitutive attributes and rules
on legitimacy, legality, and authority that make up a governance object. There is
thus a conceptual double relation between constituting an entity and a gover-
nance object, to the extent that it becomes “co-constitutive of their identities”
(Corry 2013:90).5
Conceptually, it is not the self-constituting authorship of a speaker that pro-
duces designations and addressees—designations constitute governance objects
and entities. Designations as meaning imposition aim to communicate general
validity concerning their key aspects. Therefore, they are always relational. How-
ever, entities only become visible as a consequence of designations in a social
environment not subscribing to identical rules and attributes concerning
governance objects. It is to this extent that social relations constitute entities
(see Figure 1).
Designations constituting entities and governance objects may largely overlap,
resulting in entities with distinct, but largely compatible visions. With communi-
cated designations, there is “difference” but not direct “Othering” involved. Des-
ignations may change the meaning of a governance object and, through their
co-constitutive force, the identity of relating entities as well. As a result, entities’
identities are also influenced by other designations concerning a governance
object. As a crucial consequence, this conception permits emphasizing the con-
tingency of social entities.
In this approach, political power consists in the capacity to bind collectivities
(Nassehi 2002:45–49). Such power may, but does not necessarily, presuppose
coercion and does not assume a preexisting, intentional agent. Power relies on
the visibility of a collectivity which, in case of contradiction, subscribes to a spe-
cific designation. Once an entity becomes visible, it can be addressed, reflexively
4Of course there are countless well-established authors, but they are constantly re-produced in social relations.
5Olaf Corry’s interest is in social order evolving around governance objects. We are interested more specifically
in theorizing the emerging relations unfolding between governance objects and entities.
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in its own communication and relationally in communication with other entities,
as a precondition of agential power. Entities can then be governed as well. Com-
municated designations seeking to forcefully bind a contradicting entity effec-
tively aim to turn that entity into a governance object. By submitting, an entity
will lose its status as an agent in communication.
In terms of communication this first, constitutive phase evolves into a second
phase of unfolding relations, which involves established (visible) entities oriented
toward a governance object. Designations may still be compatible. However,
there might also be competing designations, giving rise to a conflict between enti-
ties. Initially, communicated designations expect acceptance. Rejection consti-
tutes the Other in conflict, an Other who advances competing designations.
Relations communicating competing designations between visible entities consist
of constitutive incompatibilities concerning the meaning of governance objects,
and hence of these entities themselves. In effect, such communication of contra-
diction and opposition politicizes existing designations and thus discloses under-
lying power relations which may have remained implicit.
When designations constituting entities’ identities are questioned, a conflict
may escalate, leading to opponents partaking in relational securitization.
As Messmer (2007:104) argues, “it is less the particular content that influences
the course of a specific conflict but rather the particular form . . . expressing the
contradiction.” Based on Messmer’s conflict model, we distinguish different ways
of communicating conflict, in terms of either interest or identity incompatibili-
ties (Diez, Stetter and Albert 2006). Compatible designations limit contradiction
and opposition to issues that are trivial, in the sense that they can be reduced to
interest incompatibilities. By contrast, competing designations that mutually
question or exclude the identity and legitimacy of an opponent as an entity,
defined by its relation to the contested governance object, give rise to antagonis-
tic relations and to constructing opponents as danger, thereby securitizing the
conflict (Messmer 2007). Once a conflict stabilizes in its orientation toward
opponents, repeated communication of mutually exclusive designations
invites them to construct their identities against each other—the well-known
FIG 1. Designations: Constituting Governance Objects and Entities
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“Othering,” albeit with the difference that the “Other” actively partakes in its
own securitization.
The State and Protest
In this paper, we investigate the emergence of a specific protest movement as
part of a relational antagonism. Protest movements are particularly well suited
to trace the emergence of political entities from relational processes in com-
munication since their early formation phase allows studying the establishment
of visibility and addressability and then the workings of designations (McAdam,
Tarrow and Tilly 2001:159). That being said, new conflicts and relational
antagonisms emerge against a dense net of existing designations which are
expressive of a configuration of existing entities (such as states) and their
stakes in these designations (Jackson and Nexon 1999). In other words,
whereas new emergent entities might be pure derivatives of antagonistic rela-
tions, “old” political collectivities (such as the United States) are not emergent
to the same extent, but are nonetheless continually reproduced and even
changed by a particular conflict.
This paper is particularly interested in the last phase described above: the
securitization of relations and conflict (beyond mere interest incompatibilities).
If one of the parties is “a state,” then the antagonism inevitably evolves along
somewhat familiar trajectories. As mentioned, competing designations mutually
question or even exclude the legitimacy of an opponent as an entity. Due to the
stable designations with regard to intentions, actions, and powers given to the
state, such an antagonism then starts evolving around one or several instances of
a state’s ontological existence (cf. Mitzen 2006). Most significantly, this regards
the reproduction of the state in its (ascribed) right as political sovereign and
holder of the monopoly of violence. As part of that, it regards the state’s (unilat-
eral) power to designate (and defend) a territory as well as to both define and
enforce the rules that need to be followed with regard to a governance object.
Once an entity is given “security importance,” its status has implications for the
reproduction of “the state” as sovereign political entity and its ability to bindingly
designate collectivities (cf. Onuf 1991; Luhmann 2000). The multifaceted chal-
lenge to this “right” through protest movements is at the heart of the political
conflict we are interested in.
Furthermore, the ascribed powers of “the state” are manifest in how it affects
orientations in designations overall, and specifically in how restricted competing
designations are. Already existing designations in relation to a governance object
produced by the state act like powerful magnets in any emerging conflict. If
becoming a visible political collectivity means establishing constitutive incompati-
bilities concerning the meaning of governance objects, then entering into such a
relation with the state always means reacting to designations that are already
well-established by, and around, the state; and thereby always also reproducing a
particular image of the state.
The Securitization of Anonymous as Relational Antagonism
In this section, we show how a focus on the relational constitution of Anony-
mous and on designations adds to our understanding of social conflict. We dem-
onstrate how designations with regard to cyberspace (as governance object) lead
to the visibility of an entity—and how “Anonymous” thus emerged as an addres-
see. We then show how competing designations turned opponents against each
other and how the conflict became securitized—and we show how this conflict is
constitutive of the conflict parties who actively (though not always intentionally)
take part in their own securitization.
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What and where is a/Anonymous? In a very real sense, and not just on con-
ceptual grounds, there is no direct access to this entity, but we do have access to
(some) relevant communication about it. Many different (emergent and more
stable) entities are involved in communicating about “Anonymous” in multiple
ways. In other words, the history of Anonymous is the history of its ascribed
actions, observations of these actions, and the media magnification of it.6 Forms
of expression to observe designations are written statements (press releases,
online statements, etc.); visual content (YouTube videos, images); secondary lit-
erature (academic and press material on Anonymous and the relation between
the state and Anonymous); speech (as reported in the media); and, importantly,
attributed deeds (“actions”) and their communicative meaning.
In a first subsection, we look at the beginnings of Anonymous and focus on
the emergence of Anonymous as visible political entity in the second. In the
third, we look at how mutual referencing occurred in the conflict space and how
antagonisms between “Anonymous” and “the state” became securitized, against
the backdrop of how the collectivity-binding designations that continuously
reproduce the state also extend to cyberspace. The resistance to such meaning
imposition efforts is a basic aspect of the relational antagonism that subsequently
emerged. This becomes apparent when Anonymous is presented as a threat to
certain bases of the state’s ontological existence, while these bases are at the
same time reproduced in the particular way the conflict is constructed. In the
fourth subsection, we show how Anonymous exposes the limits of state power
and how the creation of “visibility” of the involved designations is a key political
issue.
The Superiority of Lulzing Trolls
The social conflict, through which “Anonymous” emerges, hardly appears as an
inevitable or intentional development. Rather, its roots are found in a primordial
ooze that gave rise to a mode of expression exhibiting specific rules and attri-
butes centered on two elements. First, some roots of Anonymous can be traced
back to a particular, in itself purely technical, software configuration of a text
board called 4chan, with the Random board being the most “famous” subsite,
known as/b/. The particular software used on 4chan, and the many other
“chans” that followed, invites users to behave in particular ways and is the
background for an unfolding process of “anonymous” individuals becoming
“Anonymous,” the collectivity. Thus, the site itself requires no registration for
participation, and there is not even a need to choose a nickname.7 If left blank,
the site automatically assigns the default name “Anonymous” (over 90% of all
users use that option, see Bernstein, Lebow, Stein and Weber 2011).
Furthermore, posts are judged on the merit of their content rather than on
the prominence or status of their author.8 Posts are extremely short-lived
(ephemeral): the median life of a thread is 3.9 minutes, and it spends an aver-
age of 5 seconds on the first of 15 comment pages (Bernstein et al. 2011). If a
post reaches the end of page 15, it expires and is deleted (forever). A post’s
6It is noteworthy that many aspects of its emergence are not well documented, or not documented at all. For
one discussion of this “problem” among people associated with, and interested in, one specific Anonymous activity,
see the quite substantial Talk page associated with the entry about the so-called Habbo raids, an early collective
activity of (a group of) Anonymous at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Habbo. (Accessed August 8, 2014.) In par-
ticular, the Wikipedia entry caused (and continues to cause) problems because there were no “reliable sources”
(that is, written material) to quote, which led to a discussion of the link between “official sources” and the “reality”
of a phenomenon.
7/b/-board does not even ask for a name anymore; it is just assumed that a user will post as Anonymous.
8See interview with the founder of 2ch, The Philosophy of 2chan. Available at http://www.nihonreview.com/
forum/index.php?PHPSESSID=28a710b85414dd9251818552a2f8ffe7&topic=333.0;wap2. (Accessed August 8, 2014.)
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position on the 15 pages is related to how much or little the particular content
is appreciated by other users: it can be “bumped” (if somebody replies to a
thread, it jumps back to first position) or “saged” (which moves it down to
the end of page 15 faster). This leads to very high turnover and innovation
in terms of content. Posting behavior (and content) on/b/is entirely discon-
nected from any stable identity which results in a disinhibited type of humor
that is offensive and crude (to say the least), and operates at the expense of
others. This type of Schadenfreude is called “lulz,” and works best if the victim
gets (very) angry.9
The second element of the emerging, specific mode of expression on the
anonymous, ephemeral interaction at 4chan is the so-called (Internet) meme.
Memes, in short, are ideas, concepts, patterns, words, hashtags, videos, pictures,
etc., that spread through the Internet and gain a certain mass of followers/
reproducers (often in a “viral” way, that is, quickly and globally). Memes are usu-
ally short-lived but they often evolve, effectively building a particular web of
meaning which is hard to understand for uninitiated people. Deep knowledge
of 4chan’s particular and interrelated meme culture, including a specific type of
language and/or style (which changes all the time), is necessary to become a
“member” of Anonymous (Underwood 2009). Memes thus play a central role in
constituting the collectivity “Anonymous” as inhabitants of cyberspace.
The meaning of these two particular elements—the particular software config-
uration plus the meme culture—was a formative part of an emerging proto-
designation that easily took hold. It established an early boundary, between an
“inside” of belonging, of insiders subscribing to the cultural (and technical)
rules and able to decode them, and an “outside,” marked by absence of the
same.
On a larger scale, however, there was no such thing as an “entity” Anonymous
at this stage. “Anonymous” was merely an assignment made, analogous to that
undertaken by many other electronic forums configured in a technically similar
way. Increasingly however, effective links between these individual components
were forged by integrating new elements and developed into something more
discrete. By around 2006, observations of a larger, anti-individualistic collectivity
appeared, when meme content from the 4chan community began to influence
the larger Internet culture and became a mass phenomenon.10 To affiliate one-
self with Anonymous at that time was to “announce your association with an
esoteric brand of humor, a badge of pride and superiority” (Halupka 2011:39)—
superiority born out of a notion of being able to designate cyberspace better than
others.
This emergent sense of anonymous collectivity was both nourished by, and led
to, collective “raids,” which marked the beginning of the first conflicting designa-
tions. A “raid” in Internet jargon is a term for “an organized assault on a Web
site or forum by a group of trolls, normally designed to cause disruption on a
large scale,”11 and troll or trolling is another jargon word for disruptive behavior
in online contexts (Donath 1998). Raids were early forms of relational antago-
nisms. Raiders had no (common) political, ethical, philosophical, or moral
agenda, yet they effectively performed a deviant designation of cyberspace. Done
for “the lulz,” trolling reflects the fundamental ideals of Anonymous as the
capacity to incite grief (Underwood 2009:133fn.). Target selection, occurring in
9Many traits of the interactions on 4chan suggest that the majority of participants are middle-class white, male
sub/urban Americans. Almost all threads on/b/are written in English, and often engage American culture and pol-
itics when they are not about Japanese anime/manga (Phillips 2013).
10By March 2010, the New York Times reported that the daily page view total was 800,000 and that the site had
8.2 million unique monthly visitors (Bilton 2010).
11Available at http://villains.wikia.com/wiki/Raid_%28Internet%29. (Accessed August 8, 2014.)
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a rather opaque decision-making process12 via the suggestion of collective action
as “Anonymous” and the formation of adequate support on the/b/-board
(Coleman 2011; Halupka and Star 2011), is linked to the expectation of an
entertaining retaliatory response. What can be observed at this stage is an inter-
esting interplay between the awakening “hive mind” as anonymous, decentralized
mass and a particular image of a collectivity. Participants were most entertained
by the notion that any retaliation would be ineffective since no one and every-
one was part of Anonymous (Underwood 2009:20), and it could never be
defeated, destroyed, or made obsolete and would continue to live on as an idea.
The moniker Anonymous became part of a designation, evolving around the In-
ternet as an anarchical, not-so social space.
As a logical consequence, nobody was safe from this relational antagonism;
not even Anonymous’ “home.” A group of Anons attacked 4chan on “/b/-day,”
as a reaction to new rules put in place by 4chan administrator m00t, which for-
bade the use of the Web site for the organization of attacks.13 This “internal”
relational antagonism around 4chan resulted in a kind of fission, the designation
of 7chan (and “The Declaration of/b/Independence”) as a new home for the
old attack-willing “/b/tards” (the name given to the users of the/b/-board), and
was the beginning of a type of tribalism. The collective existed as a decentral-
ized, fluid network with a fluctuating participant base, and with participants dis-
carding individualistic markers in order to function as a leaderless mass of trolls.
Anonymous Becomes Visible
It is impossible to know exactly when the adjectival form of anonymous gave rise
to Anonymous as mass noun—a sign for a self-reflexive collectivity making an
entity—but it seems clear it was in circulation by 2006 (Phillips 2013). By 2007,
Anonymous had already spawned the Anonymous Credo (also “The Code of
Anonymous”) that initially opened with the claim “we are Anonymous, and we
do not forgive” and continued with “We are void of human restraints, such as
pity and mercy.”14 However, this “self-reflexive collectivity” is multifaceted, dif-
fuse, and unstable.15
On July 27, 2007, Fox News aired its now infamous, catalytic “Report on Anon-
ymous” which contained terms such as “hackers on steroids,” “hacker gangs,”
and “the Internet hate machine,” with one interviewee calling them “terrorists”
accompanied by the image of an exploding service van.16 Unsurprisingly, this
report was “a windfall for Anonymous” (Phillips 2013:7), with its terms and
images immediately integrated into the memetic trolling culture. In a twisted
way, Fox News was midwife to the emergence of a larger relational antagonism.
In socially ascribing certain actions to Anonymous, Fox News provided for the
visibility of Anonymous as an addressee and also presaged the outlines of an
antagonism by ascriptions implying a particular kind of danger. At the same
time, their observations contributed to establishing boundaries. In “reading”
Anonymous through a designation of cyberspace which entirely missed out on
12The Anonymous-affiliated Encyclopædia Dramatica documents some of the trolling events and “raids.” How-
ever, due to the nature of 4chan, where old data are deleted, there is no way to reconstruct how target proposition
is linked to “successful” collective mobilization into a raid or which suggestions did not gain sufficient support. It is
also impossible to say what “sufficient” support is.
13https://encyclopediadramatica.se/B/-day. (Accessed August 8, 2014.)
14See Urban Dictionary at http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=%22Anonymous%22. (Accessed
August 8, 2014.) This was changed to “Anonymous is devoid of humanity, morality, pity, and mercy” in a later ver-
sion: http://qwertydeer.deviantart.com/art/The-Code-Of-Anonymous-106893238). (Accessed August 8, 2014.)
15One researcher humorously summarized Anonymous “ideology” as: “1. Do it for the lulz. 2. Internet censor-
ship is bad. 3. Don’t hurt cats” (Crenshaw 2011).
16http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DNO6G4ApJQY. (Accessed August 8, 2014.)
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the reflection of Anonymous by its participants, it added to the demarcation of
the inside from the outside and at the same time strengthened a competing
designation of Anonymous against the “inferior,” the ones who do not know the
Internet and/or take it too seriously.17
A further consolidation of Anonymous as publicly known Internet deviants
came in 2008, when there were several noteworthy developments which ulti-
mately contributed to Anonymous’ securitization. They were set in motion by an
“operation,” now known as Project Chanology, spanning several months. Videos on
YouTube announced Anonymous’ agenda,18 along with a press release declaring
“War on Scientology,” stating that the Church’s enforcement of censorship went
against the collective’s “moralist principles” and that information should be
freely accessible. With the lulz still a key component, some scholars suggest that
Anonymous saw its constructed public image as an elaborate joke, one which
only the insiders would ultimately “get” (Underwood 2009; Halupka 2011).
Anonymous successfully portrayed itself as “an altruistic group fighting for
human rights and freedom of speech” (Underwood 2009:156), attracting the
attention of both the international media and people with a similar agenda or
inclination. This led to a considerable influx of new participants who became
active over the course of Project Chanology.19 Electronic disruptions were not
much different from the raids before, though bigger in scale (see Vichot
2009:23; also Underwood 2009; Halupka 2011). However, these online activities
were soon followed by “flash mob” demonstrations in front of Scientology
churches,20 resulting in a remarkable amount of media coverage for a protest
which had recruited only a few thousand people worldwide.
As Halupka (2011:47) observes, “Latching onto the created persona, the media
observed Anonymous as a loose knit community of cyber hackers who fought for
freedom of information and anticensorship ideals” as part of an amorphous, wide-
spread social awakening. Anonymous was effectively reflected in a public face. In a
further designative symbolism, “Guy Fawkes” masks21 were widely adopted during
the protests to hide people’s faces (Elliott 2009). Not only did these masks become
an unofficial symbol of the collective as political entity and addressee, it also con-
structed a public image that became firmly ingrained within the global perception.
In addition, the memorable Anonymous logo—a suited figure with a question
mark where his head should be, set against a UN-style globe (see Figure 2)—was
now used for all “official” communications (Walker 2011). Anonymous was visual-
ized as a virtual non-entity (Parikka 2009:111), as a faceless legion bound by a com-
mon designation. This visual branding may even have been essential in binding
together people who resist being bound to anything, or anyone. Anonymous, the
meme machine, was now a meme itself (Figure 3).
The wider politicization of Anonymous is about conflicting designations of
cyberspace as a governance object. Its challenge to Scientology is the attempt to
designate what is legitimate conduct (that is, electronic civil disobedience) and
what is not (for example, censorship). In the emergence of mutual referencing,
such meaning imposition was contested by Scientology, which sought to reject it
by designating Anonymous as a different collectivity, as Internet terrorists
(Jacobsen 2009).
17On how the relation between knowledge and social reality ultimately points to the power of designations, see
Guzzini (2000).
18Message to Scientology. Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JCbKv9yiLiQ. (Accessed August 8,
2014.) Call to Action. Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YrkchXCzY70. (Accessed August 8, 2014.)
19This was most evident in the attacks on Web sites such as Digg and YouTube, where the Church filtered anti-
Scientology comments. See also http://www.lisamcpherson.org/pc.htm. (Accessed August 8, 2014.)
20http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/events/project-chanology. (Accessed August 8, 2014.)
21Graphically, it is inspired by the film (and graphic novel) “V for Vendetta,” in which a vigilante character
wears such a mask while overthrowing a totalitarian British government in an imagined dystopian future.
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Ultimately, and importantly, the considerable influx of new participants into
Anonymous during Operation Chanology led to a sort of schism between the
Lulzers and the Moralists (consisting of new members and some old participants
who were tired of “the lulz”)—a significant re-designation of the collectivity.
Anonymous thereafter became much more strongly associated with a hacker
philosophy, against the censorship of Information, using new forms of activism
in the process (Rolfe 2005). This resulted in activities such as Operation Didgerdie,
Operation Titstorm, and a collaborative effort with the torrent housing Web site,
The Pirate Bay, in support of the Iranian election protests (to name just a
few).22 Even more importantly, in its continuous emergence, Anonymous was
aligned with state cyber-designations.
FIG 2. The “Official” Anonymous Logo
FIG 3. A Meme about a Meme
22There were other protests being organized on the Internet almost concurrent with Project Chanology. For
example, using Facebook and other online social tools, Oscar Morales organized protests against a terrorist group
in Columbia known as FARC.
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Mutually Exclusive Designations and Securitization
Politically, the beginnings of antagonistic relations around designating cyber-
space as a governance object can be located in the 1980s, when states designated
this “new” space as object of (traditional) state governance. This understanding
was contested by competing designations as a “new” and unchartered, uncivilized
land (Mihalache 2002; Yen 2003), in which state power—that is, the ability to
designate a territory and define and enforce the rules to be followed in a specific
social space—has no (or at least very little) standing (Barlow 1996).
From this conflict emerge certain actors as part of a relational antagonism: so-
called hackers (Nissenbaum 2004; Parikka 2007). This category contains a very
diverse set of people, sometimes differentiated as black (bad) versus white
(good) hat hackers, which makes any generalization about this group unviable
(see Jordan 2008). Nonetheless, it can be said that a substantial part of this col-
lectivity (including well-organized entities such as the free software movement;
Coleman 2012b) reject designations of cyberspace as object of state governance
either entirely, or to some degree. Competing designations of cyberspace often
crystallize around what is known, loosely, as “hacker ethics” (Himanen 2001).
These include access to computers for all; that all information should be free;
and authority must be distrusted, also for security reasons (Levy 1984:xi).
Importantly, the right to remain anonymous—and thus invisible, un-addressable,
un-bindable—when moving in cyberspace is also a point often made.
In the particular social conflict that we are interested in, the merging of
political activism with hacking ability, so-called Hacktivism, is particularly sali-
ent. Hacktivism as a form of resistance, a “micropolitics of code” (Parikka
2009:119), reaches back several decades; and so does the state’s attention to it.
Cyber-issues were given high priority in the 1990s, when they were established
as fundamental to security, the economy, the way of life, and perhaps even the
survival of the industrialized world (PCCIP 1997)—which established cyberspace
as national security matter (Bendrath 2003). In turn, electronic civil disobedi-
ence emerged as part of a larger threat to the security of the online world
(Lunceford 2012:51). Due to the ability of data networks to collapse time and
space, attacks against them can be launched from anywhere in the world, and
discovering their origin, if they are detected in time at all, remains a major dif-
ficulty. This “attribution problem” refers (technically) to the difficulty of clearly
determining those initially responsible for a cyber-attack, plus the difficulty of
identifying their motivating factors (Deibert and Rohozinski 2009). The techni-
cal attribution problem translates, first, into an attribution problem in theoreti-
cal terms, because that which is not visible and cannot be made visible dodges
designation. Second, it translates into a political problem in challenging the
enforcement of bindings: what cannot be bound cannot be punished. Much of
the policy debate in this domain is therefore about how this visibility can be
assured and the anonymity that cyberspace grants be reduced.
Faring on hacktivist principles, Anonymous as a visible political entity fully
entered public consciousness in December 2010 with Operation Payback (Coleman
2012a). At first, Operation Payback comprised a wave of attacks on major pro-
copyright and antipiracy organizations, law firms, and individuals. Several opera-
tions were ongoing, when competing designations about cyberspace escalated
into a conflict about freedom of information, with WikiLeaks coming under
intense pressure after challenging the state’s prerogative to secrecy by publishing
US diplomatic cables. As a result of these boundary drawings establishing the
illegality of WikiLeaks, several companies froze donations to the Web site or
stopped them altogether. Operation Payback then morphed into Operation
Avenge Assange, which consisted of a distributed denial of service (DDoS) cam-
paign against these companies (Visa, Mastercard, PayPal, Swiss PostFinance, and
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many more). Soon after, and well into 2011, arrests were made in several coun-
tries (Netherlands, UK, Australia, Spain, Turkey, and the US) and the FBI issued
a statement, in which they reminded the public “that facilitating or conducting a
DDoS attack is illegal, punishable by up to 10 years in prison, as well as exposing
participants to significant civil liability.”23
What had happened between Project Chanology (no arrests) and Operation Pay-
back (at least 80 arrests and several convictions worldwide)? With Operation Pay-
back, designations pertaining to Anonymous as entity changed, and mutually
exclusive designations became decisive. When Anonymous began siding with
WikiLeaks, the conflict transformed and it became qualitatively different, not
because of a changing context, but due to changing communication. The con-
flict morphed into an antagonism expressive of incompatible relational claims
on who legitimately governs the Internet. Now, it was not only about the content
of collectively binding designations, but also about political authority expressed
through them. In this relational conflict, Anonymous becomes a danger, not as
passive projection, but as antagonist actively partaking in its own securitization.
Similar to Anonymous, the state is reproduced in this conflict communication as
key entity of organizing politically binding designations. At the same time, it is
challenged, and in the process subtly changed, by a transforming conflict com-
munication that exposes designations and makes their political binding visible.
First and foremost, Anonymous became visible as being opposed to a highly
assertive state authority and designations of the Internet as governance object
regulated by diverging rules. At this moment, Anonymous became synonymous
with hacktivism. This meant that Anonymous was steadily moving toward an insti-
tutionalized social conflict that had long since been securitized. The targets dur-
ing Operation Payback/Avenge Assange can be (and were) considered to be part of
critical infrastructures (the financial sector), the newly defined territory of the
cybered state. To Anonymous, the attacks were about illegitimate interferences
with freedom of information and freedom of speech. To the state, Anonymous
posed a danger to the bases of its prerogatives and “system-relevant” infrastruc-
tures, which explains why something as technically simple and consequentially
harmless as distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks can be designated as a
national security issue in the first place. This relational antagonism was rein-
forced by other hacktivist activities ascribed to Anonymous, hacks that displayed
genuine technical proficiency, mainly conducted by a splitter-group named Lulz-
Sec who went after high-level and security-designated targets such as HBGary
Federal (a cyber-security contractor) or the CIA Web site.24
Furthermore, Anonymous began issuing utterances that were “expected” from a
national security threat. The somewhat chilling Anonymous slogan “We are Anon-
ymous. We are Legion. We do not forgive. We do not forget. We will be heard.
Expect us” could now be read as a direct challenge to state authorities, especially
when coupled with clearly anarchist (antistate/anticapitalist) imagery and action.
Ocean metaphors used to talk about the Internet—with clear allusions to piracy
and buccaneering—speak to fears in government circles that control over digital
data is impossible, particularly once it has been stolen. “Members” of Anonymous
also started using the exact same language with which they were being designated
as a governance object, that is, calling the state a “cyber-terrorist,” and positioning
themselves as fighting a “cyber-war” against it.25 In this phase, Anonymous also
23http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/warrants_012711. (Accessed August 8, 2014.)
24While designations concerning LulzSec were different from those of Anonymous (LulzSec was in fact heavily
criticized by many other hackers for their deeds), in the wider antagonistic conflict communication such attribu-
tions pertaining to finer distinctions (along a specific issue dimension) are not made—quite the opposite.
25A prime example is Operation AntiSecurity, conducted by LulzSec. Communication available at http://paste-
bin.com/9KyA0E5v. (Accessed August 8, 2014.)
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moves closer to a type of resistance that has long been propagating (digital) gue-
rilla tactics (Bey 1991:102). In the writings of digital activists inspired by the anar-
chist thoughts of Bey and the writings of Deleuze, Guattari, Negri, and others (cf.
Critical Art Ensemble 1994), hierarchy is linked to control and power. Resistance
to state power must therefore be antihierarchical and resist statism and other
forms of mediated agency, in favor of “prefigurative direct action which might
render moves toward totalizing forms impotent” (Rossdale 2010:484).
In this last phase, Anonymous’ “form” becomes a central element of its exis-
tence, for both the collective and the state. Both within the group and in its
environment, but also on the side of state actors, there is an obsession with the
collective’s ontology (or organizational form), which is always directly linked to
the question of political agency and ability to pose a threat. Importantly, Anony-
mous is often observed as without a leader and without any hierarchies: a
“decentralized affinity group” ultimately only bound by subscribing to common
designations. In fact, this seems to be one of its prime characterizations in all
the tales about it. An Anonymous YouTube video titled, “Who is Anonymous?”
states that “there is no control, no leadership, only influence—the influence of
thought.”26 Anonymous has memes to discourage anyone from claiming leader-
ship: “Not your personal army” (NYPA) is the phrase that comes up when some-
one tries to simply tell others what they should be doing (cf. Coleman 2012a).
This deliberate amorphousness, this ghost-like existence, has always been a key
aspect of Anonymous, the ever-emergent political entity.
Exposing the Limits of State Power
Once the collective enters conflict with the state, however, it becomes more than
that. Its very existence emerges as a direct, “traditional” threat to the state (and its
ascribed sovereignty) because it “represent[s] a threat to the spatialized forms of
intelligibility and control” (Parikka 2008:116). In other words, Anonymous, as a
personification of the “Internet,” challenges the ability to designate, and effectively
govern, different social spaces. To designate, state power relies on visibility—
or on the ability to create such visibility through binding collectivities on its own
terms. Anonymous constitutes the danger of that which cannot be made easily
visible and that which in consequence cannot be bound and governed by tradi-
tional political means. This way, Anonymous moves (is moved) close to a form of
political dissent called “leaderless resistance” (Dishman 2005; also Arquilla and
Ronfeldt 2001). In our day and age, this resonates immediately with designations
of terrorist sleeper cells, and the debate about how to govern them, serving to
reinforce the fear of digital protest movement and loss of control.27
While the magnetic nature of state designations with regard to cyberspace has
been described above, we also claimed that every relational securitization rein-
forces and challenges, even changes, the state. While its ascribed ontological reality
comes with a set of stable/stabilized expectations, it also comes with some unstable
or (more recently) de-stabilized ones. Every (new) antagonism also changes and
sometimes challenges the image of the state as seemingly bodiless, powerful entity.
In fact, any (new) political collectivity is bound by designations of constitutive rules
and attributes which challenge existing designations to various degrees between
large compatibility and sweeping competition. More importantly, it is their appear-
ance that often makes existing designations visible and thereby establishes a
possibility of contestation. In that, they serve a specific function: they create ways
for society to observe itself, and add to its self-reflexivity (cf. Luhmann 1997). By
26http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x0WCLKzDFpI. (Accessed August 8, 2014.) In 2012 http://www.you-
tube.com/watch?v=Km8RPcO9ZcY. (Accessed August 8, 2014.)
27Under the provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act, computer hacking is listed under the banner of “cyberterrorism.”
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forcing visibility of designations, social conflict makes fault lines emerge through
which societal disagreements become apparent, for example, with regard to who is
to be in charge of countering a specific threat and also with regard to how specific
threats should be legitimately countered.
The verification of “the state” as powerful (or rather, powerless) governor of
territoriality is triggered by the emergence of Anonymous as political actor.
Anonymous exposes the limits of state power and is met with an excess of state
power in return, aimed toward Anonymous as governance object. Laws relating
to cyber-misdeeds are extreme, often covering the mere potential of eventual
consequences rather than the actual consequences themselves. Furthermore, the
challenge of invisibility posed by Anonymous (and many other digital dangers)
is met with vigorous attempts to obtain more surveillance power in cyberspace
and makes the attempts to reduce anonymity one of the key points in current
cyber-security debates (Du Pont 2001; Deibert 2013). The recent discovery of
enormous data collection efforts by governments (PRISM, Tempora), though
happening in a much broader context, is proof of this.
More specifically, the proliferation of techniques such as profiling, classifica-
tion, and surveillance makes the creation of “visibility” of the involved designa-
tions a key political issue. “Visibility” is essential for the attribution of agency, of
political acts and, ultimately, of decision and responsibility (Huysmans 2011), a
fact which is acknowledged by most state representatives.28 Techniques of desig-
nation that operate on reduced visibility effectively subvert political legitimacy
and accountability—and thereby politicize the establishment of visibility. There-
fore, the relational antagonism with Anonymous helps to expose sometimes
excessive and sometimes hidden state power and makes particular designations
visible and thereby contestable.
Conclusion
This paper has studied a relational process of securitization, highlighting the
emergence of social antagonists from communication itself. We looked at how
competing designations, which communicate rules and attributes with regard to
a governance object, are generative of the visibility of political entities and their
ascribed agency—not the other way around. In contrast to many approaches that
have implicitly or explicitly conceptualized Othering (and securitization) as a
unidirectional process between (active) sender and (passive) receiver, an
approach that is based on communication as a basic denominator of any conflict
reality can help us understand dynamics that less relational approaches tend to
overlook, in particular the unintentional early formation phase of conflicts as
well as their escalation/de-escalation.
Indeed, the phenomenon explored in this paper, the multistage emergence of
“Anonymous” and its trajectory toward a forceful clash with “the state,” can only
be fully grasped if opponents are seen as constituted in a specific antagonistic
relationship, in short, if the “threat” has a voice of its own and actively partakes
in such an (antagonistic) relationship. Without it, only the very last phase of this
process could be captured—the one where “the state” securitizes Anonymous,
that is, establishes “it” as a security threat and forcefully seeks to govern it. How-
ever, to understand the full context of such a securitization, how it is possible,
28For example, state representatives’ statements in defense of the prerogatives to surveillance and secret desig-
nations in the context of the United States’ PRISM program do not deny the relation between visibility and legiti-
macy. Rather, by arguing that visibility, to consist in legal and judicial oversight, was actually sufficient,
representatives implicitly acknowledge its meaning and significance. See The Washington Post, June 6, 2013,
Administration, Lawmakers Defend NSA Program to Collect Phone Records. Available at http://articles.washington-
post.com/2013-06-06/world/39776923_1_phone-records-surveillance-program-nsa. (Accessed August 8, 2014.)
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which aspects seem inevitable, and what this securitization does, we have to move
beyond unidirectional “threat-making.”
As a collective, Anonymous is bound by a common (though fluctuating) com-
mitment, continuously produced anew through designations. Its appearance as
something that can be potentially bound and addressed makes these designa-
tions visible. At the same time, the relational securitization of Anonymous—and,
we suggest, of many other social and protest movements—challenges the hierar-
chical logic (and power) of securitization, as it is traditionally understood. Con-
temporary (fluid) protest movements such as Anonymous actively challenge
(state) designations through their own designations, which thus become a form
of political resistance (though only partially intentional and as a matter of
choice). The logic of designation processes with security implications is that
competing designations are challenges toward the ontological base of the state.
The magnetic pull of security-related designations is thus both dangerous and
potentially liberating, and of relevance to many conflicts other than the one stud-
ied here. It is dangerous because it propels political protest movements or other
entities into an antagonistic relationship with the state, which by default often
leads to forceful (and violent) reactions, geared toward their dismantling. How-
ever, making visible that which tries to stay hidden as a particular form of politiciza-
tion serves a societal function, as it makes contestation possible in the first place.
There is a distinct possibility of, but certainly no automatism toward, securitiza-
tion with new designations appearing. Besides constituting entities, new designa-
tions also, on principle, emerge with the rise of new governance objects. Often,
the latter represent intensely contested issues, of which “the Internet” is but one
example. Other new governance objects, such as “the climate,” similarly raise
controversy.
Protest movements often enable political debate by introducing new distinc-
tions without which reality simply would not be perceived, indeed exist, politi-
cally. In a way, therefore, protest movements provide for the condition of
possibility of their own political resistance. Understanding the workings and con-
tent of designations (and their visibility), then, seems to be the key to under-
standing social conflict and provides us with an opening toward intentionally
deescalating conflict.
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